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Abstract—Emergence of crypto-ransomware has significantly
changed the cyber threat landscape. A crypto ransomware
removes data custodian access by encrypting valuable data
on victims’ computers and requests a ransom payment to re-
instantiate custodian access by decrypting data. Timely detec-
tion of ransomware very much depends on how quickly and
accurately system logs can be mined to hunt abnormalities and
stop the evil. In this paper we first setup an environment to
collect activity logs of 517 Locky ransomware samples, 535 Cerber
ransomware samples and 572 samples of TeslaCrypt ransomware.
We utilize Sequential Pattern Mining to find Maximal Sequential
Patterns (MSP) of activities within different ransomware families
as candidate features for classification using J48, Random Forest,
Bagging and MLP algorithms. We could achieve 99% accuracy
in detecting ransomware instances from goodware samples and
96.5% accuracy in detecting family of a given ransomware sam-
ple. Our results indicate usefulness and practicality of applying
pattern mining techniques in detection of good features for ran-
somware hunting. Moreover, we showed existence of distinctive
frequent patterns within different ransomware families which
can be used for identification of a ransomware sample family for
building intelligence about threat actors and threat profile of a
given target.
Index Terms—Malware, ransomware, crypto ransomware, ran-
somware detection, ransomware family detection.
I. INTRODUCTION
CYBERCRIMINALS pose a real and persistent threat tobusiness, government and financial institutions all around
the globe [1]–[3]. The volume, scope and cost of cybercrime
all remain on an upward trend [4]. Malicious programs have
always been an important tool in cyber criminals portfolios
[5], [6] and almost everyday we are detecting new variants
of malware programs [7]. Development and wide adoption
of e-currencies such as Bitcoin led to many changes in
cybercriminal activities [8], [9] including development of a
new type of malware called ransomware [10]. Ransomware
is a type of malware that removes a custodian access to her
data and request for a ransom payment to re-instantiate data
access [11]. Ransomware has been around since 1989, when
ransomware first appeared under the name of AIDS Trojan
[12]. Ransomwares are utilizing different infection vectors
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ranging from social engineering and Spam emails to botnets
for distribution.
There are two main types of ransomwares namely Locker
and Crypto ransomwares. The former locks a system and
denies users’ access without making any changes to the data
stored on the system while the latter encrypts all or selected
data usually using a strong cryptography algorithm such as
AES or RSA [12]. After encryption, the victim is presented
with the ransom payment instructions with possibility of
recovering ransomed data.
Ransomware has dominated the threat landscape in 2016
with annual increase rate of 267% [13]. It is estimated that
in 2014 only, cybercriminals have made more than $3 million
profit using ransomware programs [14]. Unsurprisingly, ran-
somware attacks are mostly infecting individuals who are not
security aware. Taking regular backups to a secure location
is a good counter measure to reduce effects of ransomware
infection [15]. These days, ransomware programs are indis-
criminately targeting all industries ranging from healthcare to
the banking sector and even power grids [4]. The Crypto-
ransomware programs are much more popular than Lockers
as almost always security engineers could find ways to unlock
a system without paying the ransom while the only viable
solution for decrypting strongly encrypted data is to pay
ransom and receive decryption key [16]. Therefore, focus of
this paper is only on crypto-ransomware and in the rest of
the paper, the word ”ransomware” is actually referring to the
”crypto-ransomware” only. It was already reported that cyber
security training and employee awareness would reduce the
risk of ransomware attacks [17]. However, automated tools
and techniques are required to detect ransomware applications
before they are launched [18] or within a short period after
their execution [19]. The growing danger of ransomware
attacks requires new solutions for prevention, detection and
removing ransomwares programs.
In this paper, we are using a sequential pattern mining
technique to detect best features for classification of ran-
somware applications from benign apps as well as identifying
a ransomware sample family. We investigate usefulness of
our detected features by applying them in J48, Random
Forest, Bagging and MLP classification algorithms against a
dataset contains 517 Locky ransomware samples, 535 Cerber
ransomware samples, 572 samples of TeslaCrypt ransomware
and 220 standalone Windows Portable and Executable (PE32)
benign applications. We not only achieved 99% accuracy in
detection of ransomware samples and 96.5% in detection of
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their families but reduced the detection time to less than 10
seconds of launching a ransom application; a third of the
time reported by earlier studies i.e. [20]. Our results are not
only indicative of usefulness of pattern mining techniques in
identification of best features for hunting ransomware applica-
tions but show how patterns of different ransomware families
can help in detecting a ransomware family which assist in
building intelligence about threats applicable to a given target.
To the best of authors knowledge this is the very first paper
applying sequence pattern mining to detect frequent features
of ransomware applications and to build vectored datasets of
ransomware applications logs. Our created datasets contain
logs of Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL) activities, file system
activities and registry activities of 1624 ransomware samples
from three different families and 220 benign applications.
We are using widely accepted criteria namely True Positive
(TP), False Positive (FP), True Negative (TN), and False
Negative to evaluate our model [21]–[23]. TP is reflecting
total samples that correctly identified. FP shows incorrectly
identified samples. TN demonstrates the number of correctly
rejected samples, while FN shows incorrectly rejected sam-
ples. Precisions of a classification algorithm is a measure of
relevancy of results and is calculated by dividing TP by total of
FP and TP predicted by a classifier as shown in equation (1).
Recall reflects the proportion of positives that are correctly
identified by classification technique which is calculated by
dividing TP by total of TP and FN as shown in equation
(2). F-measure is showing the performance of a classification
algorithm and is calculated by the harmonic mean of precision
and recall as shown in equation (3).
Precision =
TP
TP + FP
(1)
Recall =
TP
TP + FN
(2)
F −measure = 2 × Precision×Recall
Precision+Recall
(3)
We will also report Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC)
that is a potentially powerful metric for comparison of different
classifiers, because it is invariant against skewness of classes
in the dataset. In a ROC curve the true positive rate is plotted
in function of the false positive rate for different thresholds. In
addition to ROC, Area Under the Curve (AUC) is a measure
of how well a parameter can be used to distinguish between
two classes. AUC is a single value that summarizes the ROC
by calculating the area of the convex shape below the ROC
curve. AUC can be between 0 and 1, where the value of 1
shows optimal point of perfect prediction.
Matthews Correlation Coefficient (MCC) [24] provides an-
other measures of quality to compare different classifiers [25].
The MCC value is between −1 and +1, where in cases of
perfect prediction it gives +1. −1 coefficient shows total
disagreement between prediction and observation while the
coefficient value of 0 indicates that the classifier does not work
better than a random prediction. MCC is also a useful measure
of classifier performance against imbalanced datasets. While
Precision, Recall or F-measure values in a random guessing
would be higher than 0.5, MCC value would be around 0
for random guessing. Therefore, for making sure that our
classifiers are far from random classifiers, we will compute
MCC values for each classifier. The values can be computed
using equation (4).
MCC =
TP × TN − FP × FN√
(TP + FP )(TP + FN)(TN + FP )(TN + FN)
(4)
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II reviews some related research while Section III explains our
method for collecting and preprocessing of data in a controlled
environment. We describe feature extraction and vectoriza-
tion in Section IV. Section V introduces our approach for
ransomware detection followed by Section VI that describes
our performance in detecting ransomwares families. Finally,
section VII discusses about the achievements of this paper
and concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Ransomware programs are reportedly becoming a dominant
tool for cybercriminals and a growing threat to our ICT infras-
tructure [10], [26], [27]. The possibility of using encryption
techniques to encrypt users’ data as part of a Denial of Service
(DoS) attack is known for a very long time [28]. However,
recent adoption of eCurrencies such as BitCoin provided
many new opportunities for attackers including receiving a
ransom payment for decrypting users’ data [28]. In spite of its
simplicity and primitive utilization of cryptographic techniques
[29], ransomware programs are becoming a major tool in cyber
criminals’ toolset [30]. For any cyber threat, prevention is ideal
but detection is a must and ransomware is not an exception
[7], [31].
Situational cyber security awareness plays an important role
in preventing cyber-attacks [32]. An educational framework
that is tailored to ransomware threats [17] as well as a
tool which mimicked ransomware attacks [33] proved to be
useful in reducing ransomware infections. Moreover, technical
countermeasures such verifying applications trustworthiness
when calling a crypto library [34] or minimizing attack surface
by limiting end-users’ privilege proved effective in preventive
ransomware attacks [16].
Most ransomwares detection solutions are relying on filesys-
tem [35]–[37] and registry events [38] to identify malicious
behaviors. Investigation of 1359 ransomware samples showed
that majority of ransomware samples are using similar APIs
and generating similar logs of filesystem activities [36]. For
example, using 20 types of filesystem and registry events
as features of a Bayesian Network model against 20 Win-
dows ransomware samples resulted to an accurate ransomware
detection with F-Measure of 0.93 [38]. UNVEIL [36] as a
rasnsomware classification system utilized filesystem events
to distinguish 13,637 ransomwares from a dataset of 148,223
malware samples with accuracy of 96.3%. CloudRPS [39] was
a cloud-based ransomware detection system which relied on
abnormal behaviors such as conversion of large quantities of
files in a short interval to detect ransomware samples. EldeRan
[20] utilized association between different operating system
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events to build a matrix of applications activities and to detect
ransomware samples within 30 seconds of their execution with
AUC of 0.995. Timely detection of a ransomware upon its
execution is very crucial and systems that fail to detect ran-
somware in less than 10 seconds are not considered effective
[11]. Moreover, timely identification of a ransomware family
would assist in building intelligence about applicable threat
actors and threat profile for a given target.
III. DATA CREATION
We have downloaded 1624 Windows Portable Executable
(PE32) ransomware samples from virustotal.com which were
reported as malicious ransomware file by Ransomware-
Tracker.abuse.ch in the period of February 2016 to March
2017. Collected samples belong to three families of ran-
somware namely 517 Locky samples, 535 Cerber samples
and 572 samples of TeslaCrypt. The best type of goodware
counterpart for malware applications are portable and stan-
dalone benign apps [32]. Therefore, we have collected all
220 available portable Windows PE32 benign applications
from portableapps.com1 in April 2017 to serve as goodware
counterpart of our dataset.
We have setup the environment shown in Fig. 1 to collect
logs of ransomware and goodware samples runtime activities.
The Controller application on the host machine is randomly
selecting a ransomware or goodware sample and passes it
through FTP server to the Virtual Machine (VM). When
the sample is successfully transferred, the Controller notifies
the Launcher app to run the ProcessMonitor application and
executes a given sample. Similar to the previous research [11],
the first 10 seconds log of ransomware and benign applications
runtime activities is collected and the created log file is up-
loaded to the Log repository on the host machine. Since major-
ity of benign applications require human interactions to run (i.e
clicking on a button), we have developed an application called
PyWinMonkey which automates user interactions with an ap-
plication. When the log file is successfully stored on the host
machine, the Controller application reverts the VM back to its
original copy and passes the next sample. It is notable that
PyWinMonkey is similar to Monkey2 Android app which uti-
lized in many previous Android malware research papers [40]
for mimicking human interactions. We have used Python 3.6.1
to develop Controller, Launcher and PyWinMonkey apps (ac-
cessible at https://github.com/sajadhomayoun/PyWinMonkey)
and run ProcessMonitor V3.31 on Windows10 build number
10240 on a computer with Core i7 CPU with 8 cores of
4GHz and 16GB of RAM. For each and every process,
ProcessMonitor records loaded Dynamic Linked Libraries
(DLLs), file system activities and registry activities. We
scanned all captured logs to find unique activities throughout
the dataset (see Table I). Therefore, we will have three sets
of events namely RegistryEventsSet, which includes all reg-
istry events, DLLEventsSet, which includes all DLL events
and FileSystemEventsSet, which contains all Filesystem
events as listed in Table I. Moreover, EventType(E) is a
1https://portableapps.com/apps
2https://developer.android.com/studio/test/monkey.html
procedure that returns the type of given event (R for Registry
events, F for Filesystem events, and D for DLL events) as
shown in Fig. 2.
ControllerFTP Server
Launcher
FTP Client
Ransomware/
Goodware Samples
Logs Repository
Process Monitor
*.csv
Reverting 
Snapshot
Host OS (Win10)
Virtual Machine
(Win 10)
Fig. 1. Environment Setup to Capture Malware and Goodware Activities Log
As we will be using a sequential pattern mining technique
(MG-FSM) to detect candidate features for classification task,
we should convert our data into a sequential dataset which
is a collection of sequences such as D = {S1, S2, ..., Sn}
where Si represents a sequentially ordered set of events. We
have created a sequence of runtime events for each and every
ransomware and benign application. Si represents a sequence
of all events E caused by launching an application i ordered
by time as follow:
Si = {E1,i(argE1), E2,i(argE2), ..., E2,i(argEn)} where
Ex,y(argEx) represents event x for an application y and
argEx shows the argument passed to the event Ex.
For example, {LoadImage(C : \system32\gdi32.dll)},
{ReadFile(C : \Windows\SysWOW64\wininet.dll)}
shows a sequence of two events where the first event
1: procedure EVENTTYPE(Event E)
2: if E ∈ RegistryEventsSet return R
3: if E ∈ FilesystemEventsSet return F
4: if E ∈ DLLEventsSet return D
5: end procedure
Fig. 2. Determining Even Type of a given event.
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TABLE I
LIST OF ACTIVITIES CAN BE CAPTURED BY PROCESS MONITOR
Activity Type List
Registry RegQueryKey, RegOpenKey, RegQueryValue,
RegCloseKey, RegCreateKey, RegSetInfoKey,
RegEnumKey, RegQueryKeySecurity, Re-
gEnumValue, RegSetValue, RegDeleteValue,
RegQueryMultipleValueKey, RegDeleteKey,
RegLoadKey, RegFlushKey
Filesystem QueryNameInformationFile, ReadFile,
CreateFile, QueryBasicInformationFile,
CloseFile, QueryStandardInformationFile,
CreateFileMapping, QuerySizeInformation-
Volume, FileSystemControl, QueryDirectory,
WriteFile, QueryNetworkOpenInformation-
File, QueryRemoteProtocolInformation,
QuerySecurityFile, LockFile, UnlockFileSin-
gle, DeviceIoControl, SetEndOfFileInfor-
mationFile, FlushBuffersFile, SetAllocation-
InformationFile, SetBasicInformationFile,
QueryAttributeTagFile, QueryFileInternalIn-
formationFile, QueryInformationVolume,
QueryAttributeInformationVolume,
SetRenameInformationFile, QueryNormalized-
NameInformationFile, NotifyChangeDirectory,
QueryFullSizeInformationVolume,
SetSecurityFile, QueryStreamInformationFile,
SetDispositionInformationFile, QueryEaIn-
formationFile, QueryAllInformationFile,
QueryIdInformation, SetPositionInforma-
tionFile, QueryPositionInformationFile,
SetValidDataLengthInformationFile
DLL LoadImage
loads gdi32.dll in the memory of calling process (hence
C : \system32\gdi32.dll is the parameter for this event)
and the second event reads wininet.dll file located at C :
\Windows\SysWOW64. The size of each sequence de-
pends on the number of events that are called by an application
and varies between different apps.
Once all sequences are created, we have utilized the Find
Frequent Pattern Outlier Factor (FindFPOF) [41] algorithm
to remove any outlier sequence from our sequential dataset. It
is notable that FindPOF is among very few sequential dataset
outlier detection techniques which offers a reasonable detec-
tion performance [42]. FindFPOF benefits Frequent Pattern
Outlier Factor (FPOF) to extract all frequent patterns from
a dataset and removes outlier sequences as those with the
least frequent patterns. Outliers were detected and removed
for each ransomware family separately as it is expected that
ransomware from the same family expose common features in
compare with those from different families.
Table II reflects final datasets with the number of sequences
in each dataset. We use Dx notation to refer dataset x in
the rest of this paper. DLocky represents sequences of Locky
ransomware samples, DCerber shows Cerber ransomware se-
quences and DTeslaCrypt includes sequences of TeslaCrypt
ransomware samples. DRansomware represents combined se-
quences of all ransomware samples while DGoodware includes
sequences of events of all benign applications. We randomly
collected 52 Locky, 50 Cerber, 52 TeslaCrypt and 20 benign
TABLE II
CREATED DATASETS
Dataset Number of Sequences
DLocky 450
DCerber 470
DTeslaCrypt 507
DGoodware 200
DOF 174
applications sequences in a separated dataset for over-fitting
test as well (DOF ).
IV. FEATURE EXTRACTION AND VECTORIZATION
To detect the best features for classification task, we need
to first define detectable patterns of events and then uti-
lize a pattern mining algorithm to find Maximal Sequential
Patterns (MSP) collections within each dataset. Afterwards,
every sequence within every relevant dataset is traversed based
on a given MSP collection to provide features for training
classifiers.
Sequential pattern mining techniques discover all subse-
quences (Sequential Patterns) that appear in a given sequen-
tial dataset with frequency of no less than a user-specified
threshold (minsup) [42]. A sequence α = {a1, a2, ..., an} is
called a subsequence of another sequence β = {b1, b2, ..., bm}
and β is a super-sequence of α, denoted as α ⊆ β, if there
exists integers 1 ≤ j1 < j2 < ... < jn ≤ m such that
a1 ⊆ bj1 , a2 ⊆ bj2 , ..., an ⊆ bjn . A sequence α is said
to be frequent and called a Sequential Pattern (SP) in a
sequential dataset D if supα ≥ minsup, where supα (support
of α) denotes the frequency of occurrence of α in a given
sequential dataset D. Moreover, if a Sequential Pattern SP is
not contained in any other sequential patterns, it is called a
Maximal Sequential Pattern (MSP). Collection of all MSPs
with in a given sequential dataset D can be denoted as a
Maximal Sequential Pattern Collection (MCD). Members of
a MC are in format of (P, supP ) where P is a MSP and supP
shows the frequency of occurrence of P in a given dataset D.
There are two major types of sequential pattern mining
algorithms to extract MSPs namely Apriori-based and frequent
pattern growth. Apriori-based algorithms are detecting MSPs
based on the fact that any subset of a frequent pattern must
be frequent. However, recursive nature of Apriori-based algo-
rithms increases complexity and running time of the algorithm
[43]. On the other side, frequent pattern growth algorithms
are using divide-and-conquer techniques to narrow down the
search space MSPs. Due to the large number of elements in
each sequence (greater than 5000 elements in each sequence in
this paper), traditional algorithms e.g. Generalized Sequential
Pattern (GSP) [44] are inefficient. In other words, few of
the commonly used sequential pattern mining algorithms are
capable of producing maximal patterns in a reasonable time
[45]. To detect MSPs in this study, we utilize a widely used
frequent pattern growth algorithm [46] called ”Mind the Gap:
Frequent Sequence Mining (MG-FSM)” [47]. MG-FSM is a
parallel processing solution based on Map-Reduce [48] which
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can be easily deployed on a cloud infrastructure to provide
desired scalability. Low threshold values for minimum support
may generate a huge set of MSPs that affects the computational
feasibility of our vectorization model. On the other hand, very
high values of minimum support may remove useful MSPs
in detecting ransomwares from our datasets. Therefore, we
decided to choose minsup of 50% to achieve a reasonable
performance while covering sufficient number of MSPs in
our dataset. Applying MG-FSM against our datasets gener-
ates four MSP collections namely MCDLocky , MCDCerber ,
MCDTeslaCrypt and MCDRansowmare .
MCD = {(Px, supPx)|supPx ≥ minsup ∧
∀Px(6 ∃Py(Px ⊆ Py))}.
We can distinguish three types of atomic MSPs and six types
of single step transition MSPs within our sequential datasets as
shown in Table III. Atomic MSPs are representing continuous
events of the same type i.e. the atomic MSP of F represents
continuous Filesystem events. Single step transitions MSPs are
representing a transition from one atomic MSP to another.
For example, MSP of “RD” represents a sequence of registry
events (R atomic MSP) followed by a sequence of DLL events
(D atomic MSP). Since we will have one feature in our
vectored dataset for each transition; in cases of considering
multi step transitions we will have more features for each
vector. Having too many features makes a dataset sparse and
difficult to find a separation hyperplane. This issue is referred
as curse of dimensionality issue [44] which states that as the
dimensionality increases, the volume of the space increases
so fast that the available data become sparse. In this research,
we can calculate total number of features in each vector using
equation (5), where 3 is the number of considered activities
(F,R,D) and x is the desired steps in each transition. Consider
t = a, b, c as a 2 steps MSP, a can be one of 3 possible
activities (F,R,D) and as a constraint to make transition we
have b 6= a (2 possible activities for b) while for the next
transition we must have c 6= b (2 possible activities for c).
Therefore, we will have (3 × 2i) part of formula in equation
5. For x = 3 (single step, 2 steps and 3 steps transitions), we
will have total of 45 features. Therefore, we decided to only
consider single step transitions to avoid sparsity in extracted
features.
TotalFeatures = 3 +
x∑
i=1
(3× 2i) (5)
A MSP P = {E1, ..., En} is atomic if
∀Ex,Ey∈P∧Ex 6=Ey (EventType(Ex) = EventType(Ey)).
A MSP P = {E1, ..., En} is a single step transition if
∃Ex,Ey∈P∧Ex 6=Ey (EventType(Ex) 6= EventType(Ey)).
We can define a set that contains all MSP types (MSP
TypeSet) and a procedure (MSPType(MSP P) in Fig. 3) that
returns type of given sequence S as follow:
MSPTypeSet = {R,F,D,RF,RD,FR,FD,DR,DF}.
Support Ratio (SR) of a MSP is a value in the range of [0,1]
that shows the possibility of occurrence of the MSP in a given
dataset of ransomware and is calculated by dividing frequency
of occurrences of MSP (supMSP ) by the total number of all
1: procedure MSPTYPE(MSP P)
2: for all (Ex, Ey ∈ P ) ∧ (x ≤ i) ∧ (y > i) ∧ (i, y ≤ n)
do
3: if EventType(Ex) == EventType(Ey) then
4: if EventType(Ex) == R return R
5: if EventType(Ex) == F return F
6: if EventType(Ex) == D return D
7: else
8: if EventType(Ex) == R &
EventType(Ey) == F return RF
9: if EventType(Ex) == R &
EventType(Ey) == D return RD
10: if EventType(Ex) == F &
EventType(Ey) == R return FR
11: if EventType(Ex) == F &
EventType(Ey) == D return FD
12: if EventType(Ex) == D &
EventType(Ey) == R return DR
13: if EventType(Ex) == D &
EventType(Ey) == F return DF
14: end if
15: end for
16: end procedure
Fig. 3. Finding MSP Type of a given MSP.
TABLE III
MAXIMAL SEQUENTIAL PATTERN TYPES
Type Description
R All events must be registry
F All events must be file
D All events must be actions on dll files
RF The MSP has one or more transitions while the
first transition is from a registry event to a file
event
RD The MSP has one or more transitions while the
first transition is from a registry event to a dll
event
FR The MSP has one or more transitions while the
first transition is from a file event to a registry
event
FD The MSP has one or more transitions while the
first transition is from a file event to a dll event
DR The MSP has one or more transitions while the
first transition is from a dll event to a registry
event
DF The MSP has one or more transitions while the
first transition is from a dll event to a file event
ransomware sequences (γ) in a given dataset D. For every
sequence S we can define a Vector of size nine (9) that contains
SR value of every MSP type detected in MSP Collection MC
within sequence S as follow:
V ector(S)MC = {(SRR), (SRF ), (SRD), (SRRF ),
(SRRD), (SRFR), (SRFD), (SRDR), (SRDF )}
SR value of every MSP Type of a sequence for a given MC
can be calculated using CalculateSR procedure shown in Fig.
4. When vector of all sequences within a sequential dataset
D using a MSP Collection MC is created, we will have a
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1: procedure CALCULATESR(Sequence S, MSP Collection
MC, MSPTypeSet T)
2: SRPTotal = 0
3: for all P ∈MC do
4: if P ⊆ S & MSPType(P ) == T then
5: SRPTotal = SRPTotal + (
supP
γ
)
6: end if
7: end for
8: return SRPTotal
9: end procedure
Fig. 4. SR calculation algorithm for sequence S.
Vectored Dataset V DD,MC .
Moreover, for every sequence S we can define a SuperVector
of S as a set of Vectors created using MSPs collected from
different dataset i.e. MCD1 ,MCD2 , ...,MCDn as follow:
SuperV ector(S) = {V ector(S)MC1 , V ector(S)MC2 ,
..., V ector(S)MCn} where MC1 to MCn reflects MSP Col-
lections of different datasets. Size of a SuperVector with n
vectors is calculated by n × m where m is size of each
vector (9 in this research). By calculating SuperVector for all
sequences within a dataset D, we will have Super Vectored
Dataset SV DD.
V. HUNTING FOR EVIL: RANSOMWARE DETECTION
To detect best features (MSP types) for classifying ran-
somware from benign applications we created a dataset
MCDTotal by combining DRansomware and DGoodware and
then generated a vectored dataset V DDTotal,MCRansomware .
We then utilized greedy stepwise search method of CfsSub-
setEval [49] of Weka3.8.1 with V DDTotal,MCRansomware and
found that MSP Types of R (Registry), D (DLLs) and FD (File
and DLL) may provide best distinction between ransomware
and goodware samples (see Fig. 5). As shown in Fig. 5a
ransomware applications are tend to conduct a much wider
range of Registry activities in compare with gooodware apps.
As shown in Fig. 5b, majority of benign applications were
conducting similar DLL activities while there were much more
variations in ransomware samples DLL events. Ransomware
applications are taking a variety of Filesystem to DLL tran-
sitions while goodware samples were mainly taking only two
specific Filesystem to DLL events transitions (see Fig. 5c).
We have utilized R, D, and FD as features to train four
classifiers namely J48, Random Forest, Bagging, and Multi
Layer Perception (MLP) using V DDTotal,MCRansomware and
10-fold cross validation technique for evaluation. As shown
in Table IV, all classifiers achieved F-measure of 0.99 with a
low false positive rate (FPR ≤ 0.04). Moreover, similarities
between ROC curves of different classifiers (see Fig. 6) proves
that there is not much difference between performance of
different classifiers which is another indication of suitability
of our features for classifying ransomware and benign applica-
tions. As shown in Fig. 7, AUC value for all classifiers is quite
high (more than 0.990) while AUC value of Bagging classifier
(0.995) is very close to an optimal prediction. The MCC value
of all classifiers is more than 0.96 while Random Forest and
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Fig. 5. Histogram of the probability of SR values for ransomware and
goodware.
TABLE IV
CLASSIFIERS PERFORMANCE ON V DDTotal,MCRansomware
Classifier TPR FPR F-Measure
J48 0.994 0.040 0.994
Random Forest 0.993 0.040 0.993
Bagging 0.994 0.039 0.977
MLP 0.994 0.035 0.994
Bagging achieved MCC of almost +1 which is very close to
a perfect prediction.
To show that we have not over-fitted our classifiers, we
tested all classifiers using on V DDOF ,MCRansomware . As
shown in Table V all classifiers achieved accuracy of 0.994
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Fig. 8. MCC [24] of classifiers for detecting ransomwares
TABLE V
RESULTS OF CLASSIFIERS ON V DDOF ,MCRansomware FOR DETECTING
RANSOMWARE
Classifier Accuracy
J48 0.994
Random Forest 0.994
Bagging 0.994
MLP 0.994
in classifying unforeseen ransomware and goodware samples
too.
TABLE VI
THE CLASSIFIERS PERFORMANCE ON SV DDTotalFamily
Classifier TPR FPR F-Measure MCC
J48 0.981 0.006 0.981 0.974
Random Forest 0.983 0.006 0.983 0.978
Bagging 0.980 0.007 0.980 0.974
MLP 0.980 0.007 0.980 0.973
VI. THREAT INTELLIGENCE: DETECTION OF A
RANSOMWARE FAMILY
To investigate performance of classifiers in detection
of a ransomware family we have created DTotalFamily
dataset which contains all sequences from DLocky ,
DCerber, DTeslaCrypt and DGoodware. We then generated
V DDTotalFamily,MCLocky , V DDTotalFamily,MCCerber and
V DDTotalFamily,MCTeslaCrypt vectored datasets and fed them
to CfsSubsetEval of Weka3.8.1. All in all 13 candidate features
were detected for classification of ransomware families as
shown in Fig. 9.
Fig. 9 reveals that atomic Registry MSPs (activities) are
of great importance to differentiate between ransomware
families. Scattered values of SRR for different families in
Fig. 9a, 9b and 9c make SRR as a desirable feature for
separation of different families of ransomwares. Filesystem
to DLL (SRFD) is also a useful feature for identifying a
ransomware family as shown in Fig. 9a, 9b and 9c. Fig.
9a also shows that Locky ransomware samples tend to have
more Registry activities based on V DDTotalFamily,MCLocky
while Cerber samples performed more DLL activities (see
SRD in Fig. 9b) in compare with other studied families.
Moreover, Locky samples had the most number of Registry
to Filesystem transitions (based on V DDTotalFamily,MCLocky
and based on V DDTotalFamily,MCTeslaCrypt in Fig. 9a and
Fig. 9c respectively) and DLL to Filesystem (SRDF ) transi-
tions (based on V DDTotalFamily,MCLocky see Fig. 9a and 9b).
Finally, Filesystem to Registry transitions (SRFR) are most
common within Cerber samples (see Fig. 9b).
As detection of ransomware families is a multi-class classi-
fication task with four class labels (Locky, Cerber, TeslaCrypt
and Goodware), therefore, we have trained J48, Random
Forest, Bagging and MLP with a multi-class classifier using
SV DDTotalFamily dataset with 13 selected features in Fig. 9.
Table VI presents performance of all classifiers obtained
from 10-fold cross validation. Obtained minimum weighted
average [50] F-Measure of 0.983 with FPR ≤ 0.006 reflects
suitability of our features for detecting ransomware samples
families. MCC values of more than 0.95 for all classifiers
also indicate quality of our features in enabling classifiers
to provide an almost perfect prediction. Finally, as shown in
Table VII our features enabled classifiers to offer an accurate
prediction (≥ 0.965) even on unforeseen samples (SV DDOF ).
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, by combining sequential pattern mining for
feature identification with machine learning classification tech-
niques we could accurately distinguish between ransomware
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Fig. 9. Histogram of the probability of SR values for ransomware families.
TABLE VII
RESULTS OF CLASSIFIERS ON DATASET SV DDOF FOR DETECTING
RANSOMWARE FAMILY
Classifier Accuracy
J48 0.947
Random Forest 0.965
Bagging 0.959
MLP 0.959
and goodware samples and identify given ransomware fam-
ilies with in first 10 seconds of a ransomware execution.
We achieved minimum F-measure of 0.994 with minimum
AUC value of 0.99 in detection of ransomware samples from
goodware using Registry (R) events, DLL (D) events and
Filesystem to Registry (FD) transitions as features for J48,
Random Forest, Bagging and MLP classifiers. We achieved
F-Measure of more than 0.98 with FPR of less than 0.007
in detection of a given ransomware family using 13 selected
features detected in this study. Theoretical implication of
this study stems from application of sequence pattern min-
ing to detect frequent features of ransomware applications
to build vectored datasets of ransomware logs. Moreover,
created dataset of 1624 ransomware samples and 220 benign
applications can be used by future researchers to further our
understanding of ransomware behavior. Practical implications
may include utilization of reported features for differentiating
ransomware and benign applications for ransomware threat
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hunting while features reported for ransomware family classi-
fication are great for building intelligence about threat profiles
applicable to a given target. In recent times, researchers have
proposed the concept of forensic-by-design [51]–[53], and
another interesting future research is to extend this forensic-
by-design to capturing ransomware detection, mitigation and
roll-back. Applying other classification techniques such as
fuzzy classification can be considered as a future work of this
study. Moreover, utilization of Stream Data Mining techniques
to reduce ransomware detection time is another interesting
extension of this study. Finally, it is interesting to utilize our
technique in other emerging domains such mobile malware
detection and Internet of Things (IoT) forensics.
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